The Marriage Tax Penalty: An Overview of the Issues by Gravelle, Jane G.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RL30419
The Marriage Tax Penalty: 
An Overview of the Issues
Updated July 7, 2000
Jane G. Gravelle
Senior Specialist in Economic Policy
Government and Finance Division
ABSTRACT
Proposals to reduce marriage tax penalties have received attention; the House has adopted
H.R. 6 and the Senate Finance Committee has reported S.2346 (with provisions ultimately
included in the reconciliation bill, S. 2839), both bills that address this issue.  The
Administration has also proposed tax changes to address the marriage penalty.  This report
explains the causes and size of the marriage penalty, examines alternative proposals, and
discusses how they affect horizontal equity, efficiency, and complexity.  This report will be
updated as legislative developments occur.
The Marriage Tax Penalty: An Overview of the Issues
Summary
Both Democrats and Republicans have expressed interest in reducing the
marriage tax penalty.  The House adopted a marriage tax penalty reduction bill (H.R.
6) on February 10.  The Senate Finance Committee also reported a marriage penalty
bill, S. 2346, whose provisions were included in a reconciliation proposal in June (S.
2839).  The Administration has also proposed tax changes to address the marriage
penalty.  
A marriage penalty arises for some families  because family income is combined
and subject to progressive tax rates.  Other couples, however, experience bonuses
because the exemption amounts and rate brackets are larger for the joint returns filed
by married couples than for singles’ returns.  Approaches to addressing the marriage
penalty include expanding standard deductions and rate brackets for joint returns,
optional separate filing, and second-earner deductions.  Marriage penalties at lower
income levels also arise because of the earned income tax credit (EITC).
It is not possible to measure the marriage penalty or bonus precisely because the
taxes a married couple would pay as two singles depends on the division of unearned
income, itemized deductions, and the custody of children. When children are allocated
based on typical observed behavior, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated
that 37% of married couples have penalties ($24 billion), 3% are unaffected, and 60%
have bonuses ($73 billion).  Even if children are assigned in a way to minimize taxes,
43% of joint returns had penalties of $32 billion and 52% had bonuses of $43 billion.
  
This analysis suggests that any proposal to reduce taxes for married couples
would increase horizontal inequities that generally tend to penalize singles, based on
an ability-to-pay standard and using the relative poverty scales to measure relative
ability-to-pay.   (At high income levels, larger families with children pay the heaviest
taxes, but at low and middle income levels, the highest taxes are paid by single
individuals and the lowest are paid by families with children).
Our analysis also suggests that optional filing may be an efficient approach to
eliminating marriage penalties at the smallest revenue cost, but would add to tax
complexity.  Expanding standard deductions and rate brackets for joint returns would
be simple, but would cost the most and would expand marriage bonuses.  Second-
earner deductions add some minor complexity but, while not as target-efficient as
optional filing would be more targeted than general tax reductions for joint returns.
Per dollar of revenue loss, second earner deductions are most likely to reduce
behavioral distortions with respect to labor supply of married women, while joint
return reductions are least likely to reduce these benefits.  This report will be updated
as legislative developments occur.
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1 See the Congressional Research Service’s Electronic Briefing Book on taxation at
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtxr1.html], particularly the entries on congressional
and administration proposals, the marriage penalty, and bills for discussions.  See also CRS
Report 98-679, Marriage Tax Penalties:  Legislative Proposals in the 106th Congress by
Gregg A. Esenwein, for further discussion.
2 A more detailed report on this subject is CRS Report 98-653, The Marriage Penalty and
Other Family Tax Issues, by Jane G. Gravelle.
The Marriage Tax Penalty: 
An Overview of the Issues
The marriage tax penalty (the increase in taxes that can arise when two single
taxpayers marry) is the subject of several legislative proposals.  Provisions addressing
the marriage penalty were included in H.R. 2488, the general tax cut which was
passed in 1999 but vetoed by the President. The House Ways and Means Committee
reported a marriage tax penalty reduction bill (H.R. 6) on February 2 which included
marriage penalty provisions in H.R. 2488; the House passed the bill on February 10.
These provisions would cost $50.7 billion over the next five years and $182.3 billion
over the next ten years.  The Senate Finance Committee has reported a $287 billion
five year marriage penalty tax cut (S. 2346), whose provisions were included in a
reconciliation proposal in June (S. 2839).  Because of budget rules, these provisions
will sunset in five years and cost $55 billion.  The Administration has also proposed
more limited marriage penalty relief and has proposed revision of the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) including provisions addressing marriage penalties.  Numerous
other bills have been introduced in the Congress on this subject.1  
This report is an overview of basic issues associated with the marriage penalty.2
The first section explains how the marriage penalty (and the marriage bonus) arises
and why it is not possible to achieve simultaneously the goals of marriage neutrality
and horizontal equity across families in a progressive tax system.  The second section
discusses the size of the marriage penalty and bonus and,  importantly, the notion that
the marriage penalty is not a precisely defined measure.  The next section outlines the
basic issues of equity, efficiency and simplicity that are part of the framework for
evaluating policy and the final section discusses various legislative proposals in light
of these objectives.
How Marriage Penalties and Bonuses Arise
The U.S. system imposes taxes on a family basis, and thus combines the income
of married couples, who file joint returns.  The tax system is also progressive,
allowing standard deductions and personal exemptions,  and providing higher tax rates
as income rises (currently at 15, 28, 31, 36, and 39.6 percent).  These two features
CRS-2
3 Marriage tax penalty proposals are also contained in tax plans of some presidential
candidates.  See CRS Report RS20424, Tax Proposals of the Presidential Candidates, by Jane
G. Gravelle. 
of the tax system mean that the tax system cannot be marriage neutral.  For example,
in 1999, the standard deduction for a single return was $4,300, while the standard
deduction for a joint return was $7,200.  The first taxable income bracket applies to
taxable income up to $25,750 for a single return and $43,050 for a joint return.  If
two single individuals with $30,000 of income married, their tax liability would rise
from $6,885 to $7,648, or by $763.  While their combined standard deduction before
marriage was $8,600, their standard deduction now would become $7,200.
Moreover, combining their incomes would result in some part of their income being
taxed at the higher rate of 28 percent.  If, however, a single individual earning
$60,000 married another individual with no income, his or her tax liability would fall
from $9,230 to $7,648, or by $1,582.  By marrying, the single individual is now
eligible for a larger standard deduction, an additional personal exemption of $2,750
for the new spouse, and a wider 15 percent rate bracket.
In our current tax system, some married couples pay higher taxes than they
would if they were single (marriage penalties) and some pay lower taxes (marriage
bonuses).  Bonuses are greatest when incomes of the two spouses are less equal,
while penalties become greatest when incomes of the two spouses are more equal. 
These fundamental sources of the marriage penalty can also be used to
understand the three basic types of legislative changes proposed (all of which have
been introduced in the 106th Congress).  (1) Some proposals would reduce the taxes
for joint returns by  increasing the standard deduction (and in some cases the bracket
widths) to twice those of single returns.  If all bracket widths were increased, all
marriage penalties would be eliminated, but bonuses would be increased (ignoring the
earned income tax credit and other issues discussed below).   If only the standard
deduction were increased, the marriage penalty would be eliminated only for
taxpayers whose income fell in the 15 percent bracket.  This approach was used in the
House passed version of last year’s tax cut bill, H.R. 2488.  The conference report on
that bill increased the standard deduction and the first rate bracket, which would
eliminate the marriage penalty for many taxpayers; H.R. 6 follows this pattern. S.
2346, follows the approach in the House bill and also expands the 28 percent bracket
to twice that of single returns.   (2) Another alternative would be to allow optional
single filing, so that individuals could choose to file as singles.  This approach was
used in the Senate version of H.R. 2488.  In that case, all penalties would be
eliminated, but bonuses would not be increased.  (3)  A final option would be to allow
a second-earner deduction (a deduction of  part of the earnings of the lesser earning
spouse) which reduces penalties and increases bonuses but does not affect one-earner
couples.  Such an approach has been used in prior tax law to address marriage penalty
issues.  A related option, contained in the President Clinton’s proposals, is to increase
the standard deduction more for two-earner couples.3       
There are some other complications of the system that affect the size of marriage
penalties or bonuses.  If one or both of the individuals in the examples above had
children, then the penalties and bonuses would be different.  Single parents are eligible
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March 1997.
for head-of-household status.  Heads-of-households have a standard deduction of
$6,450, larger than that for singles but smaller than that for joint returns.  In addition,
the width of the tax brackets ($35,150 for the 15 percent bracket) is wider than that
for singles and smaller than that for joint returns.  As a result, the marriage penalty
would be larger for two individuals with similar incomes.  However, children can also
make the marriage bonus larger in some cases: if an individual marries someone who
earns no income or insufficient income to use up personal exemptions and child
credits, the marriage bonus would increase. 
A second complication of the tax system is the earned income tax credit, which
affects the tax liabilities of low income individuals.  The earned income tax credit can
add to marriage penalties, because the credit is phased out as income rises, and
marriage of two individuals with earnings can cause a quicker phase out.  The earned
income tax credit can also result in a bonus, if a single individual marries another
individual with children but without earnings, or with very small earnings, because the
earned income credit is larger for families with children.  President Clinton and
Chairman Archer have proposed to lessen the marriage penalty contained in the
earned income tax credit.
Table 1 provides some calculations of the effective tax rate across different
income levels for different family circumstances, for married couples and singles with
the same combined income. The first set of calculations shows the average effective
tax rates for individuals without children.  At the lowest level, a $10,000 income,
there is a significant benefit to remaining single, with an even split, primarily because
these individuals do not get phased out of the EITC.  That is, two single individuals,
each  with the same low income are each eligible for the EITC, but if they marry, their
combined income may be too high and the EITC will be phased out in part or entirely.
When only one person earns the income, the phaseout of the EITC is not affected, but
the single taxpayer is penalized by the lower standard deduction of singles; as a result
there is a marriage bonus (tax liability would fall with marriage because the standard
deduction would increase and an additional personal exemption allowed).   Through
most of the middle incomes, there is virtually no marriage penalty as a percentage of
income, but significant marriage bonuses.
The second set of calculations shows the effects of marriage between singles,
where one has a child.  The individual with the child is assumed to be the non-earner
in the case of the 100/0 split; if the earner was assumed to have the child, the bonus
would be smaller because the single earner would be taxed at lower head-of-
household  rates.  The assumption that children remain with the non-earner reflects
the likelihood that children would remain with the non-working spouse, who is
typically the mother, in the event of divorce, or would have had custody of the
children if the couple were never married.   According to the Census Bureau, 85% of
children who live with one parent live with their mother.4  
Note that none of this discussion considers the effect of the alternative minimum
tax (AMT) which contains its own marriage penalty at some levels.  Provisions
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Marriage Penalty Relief and Other Tax Cuts, by Jane G. Gravelle, for further discussion.
directed at the regular tax marriage penalty will not affect couples subject to the
AMT, and some couples may not receive full tax benefits because they will shift to the
AMT or have their credits reduced by the AMT.  The Senate Finance Committee
proposal, however, reduces the interaction beyond what it would otherwise be by
permanently allowing credits against the AMT.5
Table 1: Average Effective Income Tax Rates for Joint Returns and
Unmarried Couples, By Size of Income and Degree of Split
Income Level for a Family of Two
Type $10000 $20000 $35000 $50000 $75000 $100000 $200000 
No Child








 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.23 
One Child








 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.23
*Individual without the child is assumed to be the earner.  If the individual with the child is
the earner, the row would read -0.18, 0.03, 0.09, 0.12, 0.16, 0.18, 0.23.
Source:  Congressional Research Service Report 98-563, The Marriage Penalty and Other
Family Tax Issues.  Income levels are for 1997, but the effective tax rates would be virtually
the same at 2000  income levels because the tax system is indexed.   Note that effective tax
rate does not always rise across incomes due to rounding.
The Marriage Penalty or Bonus Cannot Be Precisely
Measured
Although people refer to the marriage penalty for a particular family situation or
the aggregate size of the marriage penalty, it is really not possible, in many cases, to
determine the size of the penalty or bonus. Only when a married couple has only
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6  These and other numbers discussed in this paragraph are from an update of a study by the
U.S.. Congressional Budget Office, For Better or for Worse: Marriage and the Federal
Income Tax.  Washington , DC, June 1997.  These numbers were updated for 1999 in a
memorandum from Bob Williams and David Weiner of CBO dated September 18, 1998.
7 Nicholas Bull, Janet Holtzblatt, James R. Nunns, and Robert Rebelein.  Assessing Marriage
Penalties and Bonuses.  Proceedings of the 91st Annual Conference of the National Tax
Association, 1998, pp. 327-340.  An updated version of this paper is published as Office of
Tax Analysis Paper 82, Defining and Measuring Marriage Penalties and Bonuses, November
1999, which can be accessed at [http://www.ustreas.gov/ota/otapapers.htm].
earned income, no dependent children, and no itemized deductions or other special
characteristics, and only if it is assumed that their behavior would not have been
different if their marital status had been different, can one actually measure the size
of the marriage penalty or bonus. There is no way to know who would have custody
of the children and therefore which of the partners might be eligible for head of
household status and for the accompanying personal exemptions and child credits. 
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated, using an allocation that reflects
typical behavior of married couples with respect to child custody,  that 37% of
married couples have penalties ($24 billion), 3% are unaffected, and 60% have
bonuses ($73 billion).  (Itemized deductions and earned income were assigned in
proportion to earnings).  The net bonus is $49 billion.6  However, in most of its
analysis, the CBO study relied on a measure of marriage penalties and bonuses that
assumed child custody  would be based on a tax-minimizing strategy.  For example,
if parents of two children had similar individual earnings, each would be assumed to
have custody of one of the children so that both would be eligible for head-of-
household status.  Even using that standard, net bonuses occur:  43% of married
couples had penalties amounting to $32 billion, and 52% had bonuses of $43 billion,
for a net bonuses of $11 billion.  Nevertheless, as here noted, a significant proportion
of married taxpayers–between 37% and 43%–pay marriage penalties.
A study using Treasury data and other assumptions produced different measures
of the marriage bonus or penalty.7  Using an assumption that divorced parents
occupied the same residence, and thus only one could qualify for head of household
status, the authors  found that 48% had a penalty ($28.3 billion) and 41% had a bonus
($26.7 billion), for a net penalty of $1.6 billion. This study also provided several other
ways of measuring penalties and bonuses, including estimating $30.2  billion in singles
penalties because these individuals could not use joint return rate schedules.
Interestingly, most of the Congressional proposals do not propose to allow married
couples the benefits of head-of-household status, which applies to a relatively small
group of individuals.  Without head-of-household status, the Treasury found that 46%
of couples have bonuses ($36.6 billion), 43% have penalties ($20.8 billion) and the
net effect is a bonus of $15.8 billion.  
An alternative measurement is the bonuses and penalties of single individuals
who are cohabitating, a much smaller group of people.  In 1997, according to the
Census Bureau, there were 109.2 million married adults living with their spouses (55
million  households), but only 4.1 million unmarried couple households.  Thus,
assuming that these households were similar to married households, the “single
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penalties and bonuses” measured by looking at unmarried cohabitating households
would be about 7% of the size of “marriage bonuses and penalties” measured by
looking at married households. 
Issues Surrounding the Marriage Penalty and Proposed
Remedies
  
Concern about the marriage penalty reflects an obvious reservation about
discouraging a social institution such as marriage, and the possible incentives that the
law creates for couples to live together without marriage. This issue is likely to be
more important for couples without children and in general the legislative remedies
address differences between the tax treatment of single and joint returns.  For these
individuals, the marriage penalty could, in theory, be eliminated by one of the methods
discussed above (reducing taxes on joint returns or optional filing).  It could also be
eliminated, with no revenue cost, by simultaneously increasing the tax burdens on
single individuals. Indeed, the marriage penalty only dates from 1969; its development
at that time was due to complaints by single individuals that they were being taxed too
heavily.
A major issue, therefore, is the equitable treatment of different types of families.
There are also, however, questions of administrative feasibility and of what types of
tax revisions would most reduce the distortions in the income tax system.  In this
section, we discuss the issues of equity across families, efficiency, and administrative
feasibility.  Different legislative approaches fare differently when measured by these
criteria.  They also involve different revenue costs.  For example, it is less expensive,
in terms of lost tax receipts,  to eliminate the marriage penalty through optional joint
filing than it is to reduce tax rates on all joint returns, which would eliminate the
marriage penalty, but also transform penalties into bonuses and increase existing
bonuses.
Equity Across Family Types  
One of the reasons for differences in the rate schedules for singles, heads-of-
households, and married couples is to adjust for ability- to-pay.  Because of
economies of living together (e.g. sharing items), a couple requires more income, but
not twice as much income, to achieve the same standard of living as a single
individual. Our poverty programs recognize this and measures of the poverty line
adjust for this effect. Tax changes that lower taxes,  for some or all joint returns,
would affect the equity of tax burdens across families.  Thus, it is of some interest to
explore how existing tax burdens fall on families of different types.  Tables 2 and 3
address this issue by using the relative levels of the poverty line to define families of
different sizes with equal abilities to pay and calculating effective tax rates.  Note that
about 40 percent of returns are joint returns (representing, of course, two adults);
about 44 percent are single returns, and 14 percent are heads of household.  (The
remaining two percent are married couples filing separately).  Thus, about 57 percent
of adults file joint returns, 31 percent file single returns and 10 percent file head of
household returns.
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In Tables 2 and 3, families in each column have the same ability to pay and under
a completely horizontally equitable system (if one could rely on the relative poverty
line as a measure of relative ability to pay), these families should have the same
effective tax rate; in a progressive system, the effective tax rate would, however, rise
across the rows.  Looking just at families without children (the single return and joint
return with two members, a couple without dependent children), tax burdens tend to
be higher on single individuals than on married couples with the same standard of
living.  Families with children at lower income levels receive better tax treatment
because of the child credit and the earned income tax credit, although this effect is
reversed at higher income levels.  In this case, large families who are phased out of
these credits pay taxes at highest rates.  But, in general, singles in most cases already
pay, by this measure, higher tax rates than those that are justified by ability-to-pay
measures.  Therefore, one of the consequences of addressing the marriage penalty will
be to exacerbate this differential between singles without children and other taxpayers.
The difference between joint returns and heads of household are more varied.
Table 2: Average Effective Income Tax Rates by Type of Return,
Family Size, and Income: Low and Middle Income Taxpayers
Income Level for Family of Two
Type-Size $5000 $10000 $20000 $35000 $50000 
Single - 1 -0.08  0.02 0.08 0.10 0.12 
Joint - 2 -0.07  0.00  0.06 0.10 0.10 
Joint - 3 -0.34 -0.18  0.02 0.08 0.09 
Joint - 4 -0.40 -0.20  0.03 0.07 0.10 
Joint - 5 -0.40 -0.13  0.02 0.07 0.11 
Joint - 6 -0.37 -0.10  0.01 0.06 0.11 
Joint - 7 -0.33 -0.08  0.00 0.06 0.11 
H/H - 2 -0.33 -0.21  0.00 0.08 0.10 
H/H - 3 -0.40 -0.30  0.00 0.07 0.10 
H/H - 4 -0.40 -0.20  0.02 0.06 0.11 
H/H - 5 -0.40 -0.14  0.01 0.06 0.13 
H/H - 6 -0.37 -0.10  0.00 0.06 0.13 
H/H - 7 -0.33 -0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.14
Source:  Congressional Research Service.  Data based on relative poverty levels for 1997, U.S.
Census Bureau ([http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/pre97siz.html]).  The dollar amounts refer to
the income for a family of two;  larger families in each column would have more income and singles
would have less income.
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Table 3: Average Effective Income Tax Rates by Type of Return,
Family Size, and Income:  High Income Taxpayers
Income Level  for Family of Two
Type-Size $75,000 $100,000 $200,000 $1,000,000 
Single - 1 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.30 
Joint - 2 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.28 
Joint - 3 0.13 0.16 0.22 0.28 
Joint - 4 0.15 0.17 0.24 0.31 
Joint - 5 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.31 
Joint - 6 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.32 
Joint - 7 0.17 0.20 0.27 0.32 
H/H - 2 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.28 
H/H - 3 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.29 
H/H - 4 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.31 
H/H - 5 0.17 0.19 0.26 0.31 
H/H - 6 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.32 
H/H - 7 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.32 
Source:  Congressional Research Service.  Data based on relative poverty levels for 1997, U.S.
Census Bureau ([http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/pre97siz.html]).  The dollar amounts refer to
the income for a family of two;  larger families in each column would have more income and singles
would have less income.
Note also that some approaches to addressing the marriage penalty would
expand the differences between joint returns and all other returns (e.g. increasing the
bracket widths and standard deductions for joint returns).  These changes would
lower tax rates of all married couples, and thus increase the disparity shown in Table
2 between singles and married couples without creating differences between married
couples. Optional single filing would affect only those with marriage penalties (some
two earner families with more even  income splits), while second-earner deductions
would affect all two-earner couples8.   Only these joint returns would experience tax
reductions, and while provisions that only affect two-earner families would not
exacerbate disparities between singles and one earner families, they would create
differences between married couples with different degrees of income split.  Low
income families, however, may not be affected by these changes or affected very little
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unless changes to address the marriage penalties in the earned income tax credit
(EITC) are adopted.   
Efficiency
Efficiency can be viewed in two ways: expending the smallest amount of revenue
to obtain an objective (target efficiency) and making changes in ways that reduce tax
distortions in behavioral choice (economic efficiency).
The most target efficient approach to addressing the marriage penalty would be
to allow optional separate filing because it only reduces taxes for those with penalties.
It would be possible to restrict the options to singles rate structures and avoid the
complications and inefficiencies of allowing married couples with children to file as
heads of households.  Indeed, it would be possible to have an alternative computation
on the joint return that would allow a tax credit for the difference between joint and
single rate brackets and standards deductions assuming only standard deductions, and
applying only to earned income.
The least target efficient approach would be  increasing standard deductions and
rate brackets for all joint returns, which would benefit many couples with marriage
bonuses and create bonuses for couples who previously had penalties.  While not as
target efficient as optional filing, a second earner deduction would not benefit the one-
earner couples who are responsible for much of the marriage bonus.  A variation of
this approach can be found in President Clinton’s proposal to increase the standard
deduction for two-earner joint returns.
While economic efficiency is not the principal issue in the marriage penalty, it is
worth noting that there are some ways to alter the marriage penalty that could
increase efficiency more than others.  For example, one of the distortions that might
be relieved by a second-earner deduction is the potential discouragement to work due
to the relatively high marginal tax rates faced by married women, who tend to be more
responsive to net wages than other workers.  These marginal tax rates would also be
reduced, but by less per dollar of revenue loss, with provisions for optional single
filing.  Relief granted to all returns, especially relief that does not affect marginal
deductions (such as increasing the standard deduction and, for higher income families,
widening the first rate bracket) would not contribute to economic efficiency.
Provisions that provided relief for the earned income tax credit would also affect work
incentives, but they would probably do so more effectively for relief provided by
disregarding a fraction of the secondary earner’s salary for purposes of the phaseout,
as opposed to electing separate filing or increasing the phaseout ranges for joint
returns.
While there is a lot of anecdotal evidence concerning the discouraging effect of
the marriage penalty on marriage and its encouragement of divorce, most studies have
concluded that these effects are relatively small. The relatively small number of




Reducing taxes on joint returns by increasing standard deductions and widening
rate brackets would have no effect on or simplify the tax law.  Optional single filing,
however, would complicate tax compliance.  Even if the option restricts filing to
single rates (eliminating the need to assign children for purposes of head-of-household
rates), the need to split unearned income and itemized deductions would add
complications and, perhaps, opportunities for tax planning. (It would be possible,
however, to provide a version of optional filing by providing a tax credit for the
difference between filing jointly and as singles on earned income assuming standard
deductions).  A second-earner deduction would add another line on the tax return, but
would not be very complicated.
Conclusion
Any approach to addressing the marriage penalty seems likely to exacerbate or
create horizontal inequities based on ability to pay. It is difficult to evaluate alternative
proposals using this standard.  Some proposals, such as optional separate filing, are
more target efficient than others, or contribute more to economic efficiency, but these
proposals also are likely to be the least simple. Increasing standard deductions and
bracket widths on joint returns is least  efficient, but also the simplest approach.  The
second-earner deduction, which was part of prior tax law, falls between the two
alternatives in both target efficiency and administrative complications. 
